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Scientists have been quite successful in their attempts to 
map the human genome, the genetic information stored in the 
approximately 20,000-25,000 genes that humans are said to 
possess.1  Stephen Scherer describes the ramifications of the 
Human Genome Project (HGP): 
With the success of the HGP, we have overcome the psychological 
barrier of cracking nature’s code and now face the more daunting 
responsibility of having power over the genetic destiny of our own 
species. As such, the HGP joins the ranks of the other massive 
undertakings of the 20th century — splitting of the atom and the 
conquest of space — in transforming civilization. And, just as 
Galileo’s work was foundational to proving the Copernican theory 
which debunked the notion that the earth was the centre of the 
universe, the HGP proves there are human-to-animal DNA sequence 
links, thus substantiating Darwin’s theory that we are not a unique 
life form. With this information, the HGP promises to give us 
profound knowledge as the basis to understanding how our minds 
work, to be able to quantitate nature and nurture, and increasingly, 
to be able to alter our genetic constitution.2 
Information about a person’s genetic make-up will make it 
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possible to predict his or her health and perhaps even his or her 
behavior to some extent.3  Employers and insurance companies 
may want to base their decisions on genetic information, and, 
in some cases, they might even require employees or 
policyholders to undergo genetic testing.4 
Some commentators argue, however, that access to genetic 
information may give rise to discrimination, and that 
individuals need legal protection against such discrimination.5 
I argue, to the contrary, that although individuals may need 
legal protection against access to genetic information, this is 
not because such access may give rise to discrimination, but 
because it may give rise to stigmatization or other harmful 
consequences.  For example, a person with a genetic condition 
may be denied employment or health or life insurance precisely 
because of his or her genetic condition. 
This article begins with a discussion of the important 
possibilities and risks stemming from access to genetic 
information.  I then present a case study said to show that 
genetic discrimination is manifested in many social institutions 
in the United States.  I argue that the study does not really 
identify discrimination, but rather “immoral incompetence” by 
those institutions.  I then analyze the concept of discrimination 
and its relation to the principles of the Rechtsstaat, arguing 
that discrimination violates these principles.  I proceed to 
consider and reject the idea that access to genetic information 
                                                          
 3. For more on the impact of a person’s genes on his behavior, see 
BEHAVIORAL GENETICS (Ronald A. Carson & Mark A. Rothstein eds., 1999). 
 4. See, e.g., Nancy E. Kass, The Implications of Genetic Testing for 
Health and Life Insurance, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND 
CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 299 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997); 
Mark A. Rothstein, The Law of Medical and Genetic Privacy in the Workplace, 
in GENETIC SECRETS, supra, at 281. 
 5. See, e.g., Paul R. Billings et al., Discrimination as a Consequence of 
Genetic Testing, 50 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 476 (1992); Lisa N. Geller et al., 
Individual, Family, and Societal Dimensions of Genetic Discrimination: A 
Case Study Analysis, 2 SCI. & ENG’G ETHICS 71 (1996); Wendy Lovejoy, Note, 
Ending the Genetic Discrimination Barrier: Regaining Confidence in 
Preconception, Prenatal, and Neonatal Genetic Testing, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 873 
(2001); Tara L. Rachinsky, Comment, Genetic Testing: Toward a 
Comprehensive Policy to Prevent Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 2 U. 
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 575 (2000); Kimberly A. Steinforth, Note, Bringing Your 
DNA to Work: Employers’ Use of Genetic Testing Under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 965, 968 (2001); Statens Offentliga 
Utredningar [SOU] 2000:103 Att spränga gränser. Bioteknikens möjligheter 
och risker [government report series] (Swed.). 
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on the part of said actors may give rise to the broader harm of 
“geneticism” understood as “the use of genetic notions to 
privilege some individuals and subordinate others.”6  The 
article ends with a brief discussion of the harmful consequences 
that may result from access to genetic information by 
employers, insurance companies, and others.  Among other 
things, I point out that the absence of discrimination does not 
mean that, morally speaking, everything is all right. 
2. GENETIC INFORMATION 
What is a gene?  Stephen Scherer offers the following 
explanation: 
Genes are instructions that give organisms their characteristics. The 
instructions are stored in each cell of every living organism in a long 
string-like molecule called Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA). DNA 
molecules are subdivided into finite structures called chromosomes . . 
. . Each organism has a characteristic number of chromosomes. For 
humans the number is 46 (23 pairs) and this complete set of genetic 
information is called the genome.7 
Thus genetic information is information about the 
biological material (the DNA), not the biological material 
itself.8  This conception of genetic information is consistent 
with the ordinary meaning of information, and it is also 
interesting from a moral or legal point of view. 
Much of the debate about the risks stemming from access 
to genetic information is premised on the assumption that 
genetic information is different from other health information 
and that access to it is likely to create unique problems. 
Lawrence Gostin, for example, maintains that genetic 
information is special in the following ways: 
The sheer breadth of information discoverable; the potential to unlock 
secrets that are currently unknown about the person; the unique 
quality of the information enabling certain identification of the 
individual; the stability of the DNA rendering distant future 
applications possible; and the generalizability of the data to families, 
genetically related communities and ethnic and racial populations.9 
But not everyone agrees.  Rejecting arguments that 
                                                          
 6. Susan M. Wolf, Beyond “Genetic Discrimination”: Toward the Broader 
Harm of Geneticism, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 345, 345 (1995). 
 7. Scherer, supra note 2, at 12. 
 8. See Sonia Le Bris, Give Me Your DNA, and I’ll Tell You Who You Are . 
. . or Who You’ll Become, 2 CAN. J. POL’Y 90, 92 (2001). 
 9. Lawrence O. Gostin, Genetic Privacy, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 320, 326 
(1995). 
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describe genetic information as “distinctive and especially 
sensitive,” Thomas Murray concludes that genetic information 
is not so special because genetic information is “neither unique 
nor distinctive in its ability to offer probabilistic peeks into our 
future health.”10  He further argues that concerns for kin are 
unconvincing because even though these concerns may “amplify 
the sensitivity of genetic information, it does not render that 
information unique.”11  And the concern about genetic 
discrimination is not persuasive, he explains, as genetic 
information is not unique in this respect either.12  According to 
Murray: 
Genetic information is special because we are inclined to treat it as 
mysterious, as having exceptional potency or significance, not because 
it differs in some fundamental way from all other sorts of information 
about us. Portions of that mystery and power come from the 
opaqueness of genetic information, the possibility that others will 
know things about the individual that he or she does not know, and 
how genetic information connects the individuals to immediate family 
and more distant kin. The more genetic information is treated as 
special, the more special treatment will be necessary. Yet none of 
these factors is unique to genetic information.13 
Murray is right.  While access to genetic information by 
various social institutions may constitute a threat to the 
individual, the same could be said about all forms of medical 
information.  Nevertheless, we need not hold that genetic 
information is special, let alone unique, in order to worry about 
the consequences of access to such information by various social 
institutions.  It suffices to observe that genetic information is 
difficult to handle. 
3. GENETIC DISCRIMINATION: A CASE STUDY 
Paul Billings and his coauthors have conducted a series of 
tests to determine whether access to genetic information may 
give rise to genetic discrimination.14  More specifically, the 
1992 study aimed “to discover whether incidents which may 
reflect genetic discrimination are occurring in the workplace, in 
                                                          
 10. Thomas H. Murray, Genetic Exceptionalism and “Future Diaries”: Is 
Genetic Information Different from Other Medical Information?, in GENETIC 
SECRETS, supra note 4, at 60, 64. 
 11. Id. at 65. 
 12. Id. at 65-67. 
 13. Id. at 71. 
 14. Billings et al., supra note 5, at 477. 
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access to social services, in insurance underwriting, and in the 
delivery of health care.”15 
The authors contacted 1,119 New England professionals 
working in “clinical genetics, genetic counseling, disability 
medicine, pediatrics, and social services” and asked about 
incidents of “possible genetic discrimination.”16  They received 
forty-two responses.  They excluded thirteen of these responses 
because the incidents reported did not meet the authors’ 
criteria for genetic discrimination or were insufficiently 
informative.  The remaining responses described forty-one 
incidents of possible genetic discrimination.  Thirty-two of the 
incidents involved insurance, seven involved employment 
issues, and two concerned other matters.17  The authors 
concluded that discrimination is manifested in many social 
institutions, especially in the fields of health and life insurance. 
Specifically they stated: 
Problems with insurance companies arose when individuals altered 
existing policies because of relocations or changes of employers. New, 
renewed, or upgraded policies were frequently unobtainable even if 
individuals labeled with genetic conditions were asymptomatic. 
Assessment of the natural history of the genetic condition or 
evaluation of the fitness of the individual by physicians had little or 
no influence on the adverse outcomes presented by the respondents.18 
However, this important study is marred by the authors’ 
insufficient attention to the analysis and definition of concepts. 
In particular, they failed to define the concept of 
discrimination.  To be sure, they defined the concept of genetic 
discrimination as “discrimination against an individual or 
against members of that individual’s family solely because of 
real or perceived differences from the ‘normal’ genome of that 
individual.”19  Furthermore, they distinguished genetic 
discrimination from “discrimination based on disabilities 
caused by altered genes” by excluding from the aforementioned 
category “those instances of discrimination against an 
individual who at the time of the discriminatory act was 
affected by the genetic disease.”20  They did not, however, define 
                                                          
 15. Id.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Id. at 477-78. 
 18. Id. at 478. 
 19. Id. at 477. Essentially the same understanding of “genetic 
discrimination” is adopted in Geller et al., supra note 5, at 72, and Lovejoy, 
supra note 5, at 874 n.8. 
 20. Billings et al., supra note 5, at 477. 
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the concept of discrimination simpliciter. 
The authors’ failure to define the concept of discrimination 
allowed them to include under the rubric “discrimination” acts 
based on real or perceived differences from what is considered 
to be normal—in this case the normal human genome.  I 
therefore assume that they defined “discrimination” as an 
action that (i) is based on real or perceived differences from a 
certain standard, and (ii) is unfavorable to the person who 
deviates from that standard.  But such behavior is not 
necessarily discrimination, and it should not be portrayed as 
such.  
4. DISCRIMINATION 
I propose the following definition of the concept of 
discrimination: one person, A, discriminates against another 
person, B, if, and only if, A intentionally treats B worse than A 
treats, or would treat, others in similar circumstances.21  On 
this analysis, discrimination involves an intentional breach of 
the principle of formal justice, which asks us to treat like cases 
alike (and different cases differently).22 
This definition captures the widely shared idea that 
discrimination involves basing one’s decision on morally 
irrelevant reasons, as the cases must be alike in morally 
relevant respects.  Discrimination thus conceived is morally 
wrong, as we expect it to be.  More specifically, if an action (or 
action-type) is discriminatory in this sense, one has a pro tanto 
moral duty not to perform it.23 
I think of the proposed definition as an explication of the 
concept of discrimination as understood in ordinary usage.24  To 
                                                          
 21. When I say that A treats B worse than he treats others in similar 
circumstances, I mean that A causes B harm over and above the unfairness 
that consists in breaching the principle of formal justice. On my analysis, the 
alleged harm is harm if, and only if, it would be considered harm by most 
people. For more on this topic, see Lena Halldenius, Discrimination: What Is 
It and How Is It Bad? 1-3, 11-2 (unpublished paper, on file with the author). 
 22. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 155-56 (1961); NEIL 
MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 73-99 (1st ed. 1978) 
(explaining the concept of formal justice); see also Kenneth I. Winston, 
Treating Like Cases Alike, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1974). 
 23. As Shelley Kagan explains, “[a] pro tanto reason has genuine weight, 
but nonetheless may be outweighed by other considerations.”  SHELLEY 
KAGAN, THE LIMITS OF MORALITY 17 (1989). 
 24. See, e.g., OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 183 (1980) (defining 
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explicate a concept is to transform a vague and/or ambiguous 
“pre-theoretical” concept, explicandum, into one that is more 
exact, explicatum, while retaining its intuitive content.  
Explication makes the concept more functional for a certain 
purpose—in this case to transform “discrimination” into a 
useful tool in moral, political, or legal thinking generally.  Such 
a reconstruction is of course partly prescriptive.25  
Nevertheless, I believe that on the whole my definition is in 
keeping with ordinary usage. 
Shelley v. Kraemer26 presents us with a clear case of 
discrimination thus conceived.  The case concerns the 
constitutional validity of judicial decisions enforcing so-called 
restrictive covenants, that is, private agreements between 
property owners to exclude members of a designated race from 
the ownership or occupancy of real estate.  In 1911, a number 
of property owners in St. Louis signed an agreement not to sell 
their property “for resident or other purpose [to] people of the 
Negro or Mongolian Race.”27  In August 1945, a black couple, 
Mr. and Mrs. Shelley, unaware of the covenant, bought 
property in the restricted neighborhood.28  In October 1945, a 
group of property owners brought suit, requesting that Mr. and 
Mrs. Shelley be restrained from taking possession and divested 
of title.29  The Shelleys objected that judicial enforcement of a 
restrictive covenant would violate their rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which provides, inter alia, that no 
state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”30  The Supreme Court held that judicial 
enforcement of restrictive covenants does violate the equal 
protection clause.31 
                                                          
“discriminate” as “to make a distinction, to give unfair treatment, especially 
because of prejudice”); CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY 430 (11th ed. 2004) 
(defining “discriminate” as to “make an unjust distinction in the treatment of 
different categories of people, especially on the grounds of race, sex, or age”); 
SVENSKA AKADEMIENS ORDLISTA (11th ed. 1986) (Swed.) (defining 
“discrimination” as “unfavorable special treatment,” in Swedish: ogynnsam 
särbehandling). 
 25. See TORBEN SPAAK, THE CONCEPT OF LEGAL COMPETENCE: AN ESSAY 
IN CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 26-48 (1994). 
 26. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 27. Id. at 5. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 6. 
 30. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. 
 31. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 23. 
SPAAK_FINAL.DOC 05/19/2006  12:41:48 PM 
646 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 7:2 
 
 
Clearly, the very idea of a restrictive covenant is 
discriminatory.  Such an agreement is designed to exclude 
certain people from the ownership of property on the basis of 
their race, although race must surely be considered an 
irrelevant characteristic in regard to property transactions. 
Under the proposed definition of discrimination, 
affirmative action plans necessarily discriminate against 
applicants who are not accorded preferential treatment under 
the plan in question.32  Such plans are designed to favor the 
members of one group, A, over the members of another group, 
B, even though the members of A are less qualified in the 
relevant respect than the members of B.33  Defenders of 
affirmative action often argue that “diversity” on campus or in 
the workforce is so important that we are justified in according 
preferential treatment to members of a minority group.34  But 
even if—incredibly—“diversity” were important,35 applicants 
who are not accorded preferential treatment under the plan 
would still be discriminated against. 
This article’s concept of discrimination differs significantly 
from the concept of discrimination used by Billings and his 
colleagues. Whereas they maintain that the decisionmaker 
must not take into account any facts about a person’s genetic 
make-up, I argue that discrimination does not occur if such 
facts are relevant to the decision.  
My definition is preferable for two reasons.  First, if the 
                                                          
 32. One would expect those who speak of reverse or compensatory 
discrimination to share this view.  See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, Equal Treatment 
and Compensatory Discrimination, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 348 (1973); George 
Sher, Justifying Reverse Discrimination in Employment, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
159 (1975).  But see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 223 (2d. ed. 
1978). 
 33. Lena Halldenius maintains that affirmative action does not qualify as 
discrimination under this definition, as it does not involve an intent to harm.  
Specifically, she maintains that the harm done to those who lose out under an 
affirmative action plan is just an “unintended side effect.”  See Halldenius, 
supra note 21, at 13.  But that cannot be right.  To benefit one person under 
an affirmative action plan is to harm another person.  This is a conceptual 
necessity, not an empirical contingency.  Hence it is not an “unintended side 
effect.” 
 34. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-19 (1977); see also 
RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 386-426 (2000). 
 35. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
notion of “diversity” and its use to justify affirmative action measures). 
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facts considered are relevant to a decision, the decisionmaker is 
not necessarily guilty of moral wrongdoing.  Second, under 
Billings’s understanding of discrimination, a movie director 
who casts a white man in the role of, say, Abraham Lincoln 
discriminates against nonwhites and women.  But in that case 
race and sex would be relevant! 
The concept of discrimination that I present also differs 
from the concept used by Ronald Dworkin and others.  I  have 
defined the concept of discrimination, in part, in terms of an 
intention to breach the principle of formal justice. I have not 
addressed the discriminating party’s motivation, the reason(s) 
why an actor intends his or her action.  In particular, I have 
not argued that discrimination presupposes invidious intent.  
But Ronald Dworkin adopts precisely that stance. He 
maintains that the term discrimination is commonly used to 
designate classifications that are invidious, in that they are 
arbitrary, or reflect prejudice or favoritism: 
Against the background of centuries of malign racial discrimination, 
phrases like “discriminate against someone because of race” or 
“deprive someone of an opportunity because of race” may be used in a 
neutral . . . sense, so that any racial classification whatsoever is 
included.  Or they may be used (and I think are commonly used) in an 
evaluative way, to mark off racial classifications that are invidious, 
because they reflect a desire to put one race at a disadvantage against 
another, or arbitrary, because they serve no legitimate purpose, or 
reflect favoritism, or because they treat members of one race with 
more concern than members of another.36 
The difference between my understanding of the concept of 
discrimination and Dworkin’s understanding is important.  On 
my understanding, affirmative action plans necessarily 
discriminate against applicants who are not accorded 
preferential treatment.  On Dworkin’s analysis, such plans do 
not necessarily discriminate as the element of prejudice, 
contempt, or favoritism is typically lacking.37 
Dworkin’s concept of discrimination is neither more 
consistent with ordinary usage nor otherwise preferable to my 
understanding of that concept.  I maintain that the intentional 
                                                          
 36. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 316, 318 (1985); see also 
Joe R. Feagin & Douglas Lee Eckberg, Discrimination: Motivation, Action, 
Effects, and Context, 6 AM. REV. SOC. 1 (1980) (analyzing such prejudice-
motivated discrimination). 
 37. Not surprisingly, on Dworkin’s analysis, supra note 36, few of the 
instances of “discrimination” identified by Billings et al., supra note 5, would 
count as discrimination, as the element of prejudice, contempt, or favoritism is 
typically lacking in such cases. 
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breach of the principle of formal justice, not the reason for the 
breach, is the important point.  Being told that this principle 
was breached not for reasons of prejudice, contempt, or 
favoritism, but for “diversity” or some other reason, will not 
placate anyone who has been rejected because somebody else 
was accorded preferential treatment.38  The person who was 
rejected is most concerned that he or she lost out in competition 
with someone less qualified, that he or she was just a pawn in 
the game, as it were. 
I would like to address the requirement of intent and the 
relevance requirement in my proposed definition of 
discrimination.  As I have said, discrimination involves an 
intentional breach of the principle of formal justice.  But why 
not allow a negligent breach of the principle to qualify as 
discrimination?  Consider a case in which an employer hires a 
less qualified male engineer instead of a better qualified female 
engineer because he believes that women simply should not be 
employed outside the home.  On the employer’s analysis, a 
person’s sex is a relevant consideration with respect to 
employment outside the home, and a male and a female 
applicant can never be in similar circumstances with regard to 
such employment.  Since we can safely say that the employer is 
mistaken about what factors are relevant and what factors are 
irrelevant in this case, the employer does not intentionally 
breach the principle of formal justice.  But we may say that the 
employer is negligent, as the employer fails to realize that 
there is no solid basis for the assumption that women should 
not be employed outside the home.  However, a negligent 
breach of the principle of formal justice will not qualify as 
discrimination under the proposed definition of discrimination. 
But, one might object, surely the employer has discriminated 
against the female applicant! 
I do not agree.  The distinction between intentional and 
negligent action is morally relevant, as is clear from common 
sense morality and the differential punishment that all 
governments attach to intentional and negligent crimes.  Since 
discrimination is a fairly grave form of moral wrongdoing, 
                                                          
 38. See Owen M. Fiss, The Fate of an Idea Whose Time Has Come: 
Antidiscrimination Law in the Second Decade After Brown v. Board of 
Education, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 742, 763 (1974) (“[T]he unfairness to the 
excluded individual is perhaps no different from the unfairness of ‘traditional’ 
discrimination”); see also DWORKIN, supra note 32, at 231. 
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negligent discrimination does not seem to be sufficiently 
harmful to qualify as discrimination.  I also doubt whether a 
wider definition of discrimination would be in keeping with 
ordinary usage. 
I now turn to the relevance requirement.  Discrimination, 
as I have said, involves an intentional breach of the principle of 
formal justice, and the relevance requirement ensures that the 
parties involved are alike in relevant respects.  But the 
relevance requirement is not without its problems. 
Consider, for example, the case of a grossly immoral 
practice, such as the persecution of Jews in the Third Reich, 
apartheid in South Africa, or “land reform” in Zimbabwe.  
While race or ethnic origin is clearly relevant to these practices, 
one could not reasonably maintain that no discrimination has 
occurred.  However, when I maintain that a person’s genetic 
make-up, sex, race, or ethnic origin might be relevant, I have in 
mind activities that are morally legitimate, such as running a 
business, a university, or a sports team, or shooting a movie.  
Admittedly, I have done nothing to explain which practices are 
legitimate and why they are legitimate.  There is a good deal of 
agreement about which practices are legitimate and which are 
not.  While there will no doubt be borderline cases, they will be 
rather few and insignificant. 
Consider also the less dramatic case of a shop owner who 
prefers to hire white staff because he correctly predicts that his 
customers would stop frequenting his shop if he hired black 
staff.  Running a shop is obviously a perfectly moral activity, 
and although the owner correctly judges the likely 
consequences of hiring staff of the “wrong” color, many people 
would nevertheless maintain that the owner is guilty of 
discrimination.  I do not agree.  The owner is simply adjusting 
to the situation and acting accordingly.  In this case race is a 
morally relevant factor, which means that the shop owner’s 
behavior does not qualify as discrimination under my proposed 
definition of discrimination. 
One might, however, object that race is one of a limited 
number of factors that are generally considered to be morally 
irrelevant in most circumstances, and therefore race cannot be 
a morally relevant factor in this case.  At some point we must 
allow moral considerations about relevance to trump 
considerations about relevance based on self-interest.  But at 
what point?  The answer will depend on whether we are 
concerned with an activity in the private sector or with an 
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activity in the public sector.  Crudely put, the idea would be 
that a business operating in the private sector may “adjust to 
the situation,” whereas an organization operating in the public 
sector may not. 
Consider furthermore the case of homosexual marriages.  
In most countries, the law does not recognize homosexual 
marriages.  Does this mean that homosexuals are 
discriminated against in regard to marriage?  On my analysis, 
the answer depends on whether lawmakers are morally 
justified in insisting that only a man and a woman can marry 
each other.  If they are, a homosexual and a heterosexual 
couple are not alike in relevant respects; therefore homosexuals 
are not discriminated against.  If lawmakers are not morally 
justified, then a homosexual and a heterosexual couple are 
alike in relevant respects, and homosexuals are discriminated 
against.39  Of course, the moral relevance of a person’s sex in 
regard to marriage is, and is likely to remain, a controversial 
moral question in many countries. Since this is so, it will be 
difficult to decide whether this is a case of discrimination. 
Consider, finally, a Swedish case—Skattefjällsmålet—that 
demonstrates how difficult it can be to determine who belongs 
to the relevant reference group.40  In this case, the members of 
a certain minority population claimed the government 
discriminated against them in violation of the Swedish 
Constitution with respect to the granting of hunting and 
fishing rights.  On my analysis, the government discriminates 
against the members of this minority population if, and only if, 
it intentionally treats them worse than it treats others in 
similar circumstances.  But who are those “others” in this case?  
Members of another minority population, members of the 
general public, or perhaps members of some other group?  The 
Swedish Supreme Court seized the first option and declared 
that the government was not guilty of discrimination because 
there was no alternative minority population available.  But it 
                                                          
 39. I thank Niclas Berggren for drawing my attention to the case of 
homosexual marriages. 
 40. Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv [NJA] [Supreme Court] 1981 p.1 (Swed.).  The 
relevant provision in the Swedish Constitution (Regeringsformen 2:15) reads 
as follows: “No Act or law or other statutory instrument may entail the 
discrimination of any citizen because he belongs to a minority on grounds of 
race, skin color, or ethnic origin.”  Regeringsormen 2:15 (author’s translation), 
available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/sw00000_.html. 
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is not clear why the Court compared the appellant minority 
population with another minority population and not with the 
situation of the general public.41 
5. DISCRIMINATION AND THE RECHTSSTAAT 
I have argued that discrimination amounts to an 
intentional breach of the principle of formal justice.  I shall now 
argue that discrimination thus conceived violates an important 
value of the Rechtsstaat, or the rule of law.  Let me elaborate on 
this. 
The Swedish legal theorist Åke Frändberg finds the core 
value of what he calls the ideology of the Rechtsstaat in the 
idea of protecting the individual against the coercive power of 
the state.42  He explains that individuals need protection from 
particularly grave infractions perpetrated by state organs, such 
as discrimination, caprice, violence, and the absence of legal 
appeal mechanisms. On Frändberg’s analysis, each type of 
infraction violates a distinct value, namely legal equality, legal 
certainty, legal security, and access to law, respectively. 
Frändberg makes a distinction between equality before the 
law, which means the uniform application of the relevant legal 
norm, and equality in the law, which means that the 
application of the relevant legal norms will not unduly 
discriminate against anyone.43  He further explains that legal 
equality, understood as a Rechtsstaat value, covers both types 
of equality.  Equality before the law is closely related to the 
principle of formal justice.  To apply a legal norm uniformly is 
to apply it precisely to those cases to which, properly 
understood, the norm applies.  Accordingly, violation of the 
value equality before the law necessarily amounts to 
discrimination.  But because Frändberg does not explain 
“undue” discrimination, we do not know what constitutes 
equality in the law.  Hence we do not know whether the 
violation of equality in the law necessarily amounts to 
discrimination. 
Discriminatory action therefore violates an important 
                                                          
 41. See Thomas Bull, Diskriminering och dekonstruktion: om positiv 
faderskapstalan, 3-4 TIDSSKRIFT FÖR RETTSVITENSKAP 693, 713, 718-19 (2000) 
(Swed.). 
 42. Åke Frändberg, Begreppet rättsstat, RÄTTSSTATEN – RÄTT, POLITIK 
OCH MORAL 21, 24 (Fredrik Sterzel ed., 1996). 
 43. Id. at 29. 
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Rechtsstaat value, namely legal equality, if and to the extent 
that it occurs in the application, or administration—as 
distinguished from the creation—of law.  In other words, 
discriminatory action necessarily violates the Rechtsstaat value 
that Frändberg calls equality before the law, but not 
necessarily the Rechtsstaat value that he calls equality in the 
law.  Accordingly, the very existence of, say, an affirmative 
action plan does not violate the value equality in the law, 
though its inconsistent administration might violate the value 
of equality before the law.  Though European writers speak of 
the Rechtsstaat44 and English-speaking writers speak of the 
rule of law,45 the terms designate very similar ideas.46 
6. “GENETICISM” 
Susan Wolf maintains that the rubric “genetic 
discrimination”—which she understands in the broader sense 
accepted by Billings and his colleagues—is “woefully 
inadequate” to deal with what she calls genetic disadvantage. 47 
She argues that we ought instead to conceive of the harm done 
to people with genetic “defects” as something broader than 
discrimination, “as rather the use of genetic notions to privilege 
some individuals and subordinate others.”48  This, she explains, 
is “geneticism.” 
The problem with “current antidiscrimination theory,” 
Wolf argues, is that it supports the idea that those who do not 
suffer genetic disadvantage are “normal,” and that the goal is 
to ensure that everyone is treated in the same way as the 
members of the “normal” group.  She interprets prevailing 
theory as prescribing an antidiscrimination approach that 
“counsels that people of color should be treated like whites and 
that women should be treated like men.”49  Such an approach, 
                                                          
 44. See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 313-14 (Max Knight 
trans., Univ. of California Press 1967) (2d. ed. 1960); Frändberg, supra note 
42. 
 45. DAVID LYONS, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW (1984); JOHN RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE 235-43 (1971); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 210-
19 (1979). 
 46. See Neil MacCormick, Der Rechtsstaat und die Rule of Law, 2 
JURISTENZEITUNG 65 (1984). 
 47. Wolf, supra note 6, at 45. 
 48. Id. at 346 (emphasis added). 
 49. Id. at 347. 
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she continues, “bifurcates the world into those who 
nonproblematically fit the norm (whites, men) and those who 
are problematically different (people of color, women).  In 
genetic terms, this means bifurcating the world into those with 
nonproblematically ‘normal’ genotypes and those with 
problematically ‘abnormal’ ones.”50 
I doubt whether anyone “makes use of genetic notions to 
privilege some individuals and subordinate others.”  Rather, 
employers, insurance companies, and others make business 
decisions on the basis of genetic information, decisions that 
may negatively affect people with genetic “defects.”  On the 
understanding of discrimination adopted by Billings and his 
colleagues, such behavior tends to qualify as discrimination.  
On my understanding and that of Dworkin, this behavior does 
not qualify as discrimination. 
If I understand Wolf correctly, she objects to calling this 
discrimination since doing that would involve “bifurcating” the 
world in a way that harms people with genetic “defects.”  But 
even if it would, which I doubt, I cannot see how introducing 
the concept of “geneticism” would be likely to improve the 
situation for those harmed.  For whereas “geneticism” seems to 
presuppose intent to harm on the part of the actor, 
discrimination as the concept is understood by Billings and his 
colleagues does not.  It will therefore be easier to prove the 
occurrence of discrimination as understood by Billings and his 
colleagues than the occurrence of “geneticism.”  Of course, this 
would not neutralize the harm identified by Wolf, a harm which 
I doubt exists, but it would do something for those harmed. 
As Wolf points out, she is inspired by the literature on race 
and gender.51  But a problem with this literature, at least as 
interpreted by Wolf, is that it consistently and mistakenly 
attributes to antidiscrimination legislation the purpose of 
producing a higher ratio of female or colored professors, 
members of Congress, or CEOs.52  That is to say, it endorses a 
result-oriented—as distinguished from a process-oriented—
conception of antidiscrimination laws.  As Owen Fiss explains: 
Antidiscrimination laws are capable of two basic interpretations. One 
interpretation–call it process-oriented–emphasizes the purification of 
the decisional process. The prohibition against discrimination is 
interpreted as a ban against basing a decision on certain forbidden 
                                                          
 50. Id. at 347-48 (emphasis added). 
 51. Id. at 345. 
 52. Id. at 348. 
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criteria, for example, an individual’s race.  A second interpretation–
call it result-oriented–emphasizes the achievement of a certain result, 
improvement of the economic and social position of the protected 
group. For example, under the result-oriented approach, the 
obligation imposed by the antidiscrimination laws in public education 
and housing is not to refrain from racial assignment but rather to 
achieve racial integration. Under a fair employment law the 
obligation is not to refrain from taking an applicant’s race into 
consideration but rather to eliminate Black unemployment and 
under-employment.53 
The problem with the result-oriented conception of 
antidiscrimination laws is that it presupposes that the 
attainment of a certain result can be understood as a claim of 
justice.54  But if the process is fair, which is what the process-
oriented conception of antidiscrimination laws is meant to 
ensure, why is the result not fair?  The idea seems to be that job 
applicants who are members of certain “protected” groups can 
claim as a matter of justice that they be hired even though they 
are less qualified than other applicants.  Jobs seem to be 
considered goods that ought to be distributed equally, or 
perhaps according to need, among the members of different 
groups.  But that is absurd!  Whereas one might argue that 
basic education, health care, and perhaps life insurance are 
goods in the relevant sense, one cannot reasonably argue that 
jobs are such goods.  Instead, jobs should be “distributed” 
according to the principles of a free market. 
7. HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES 
I have argued that one person, A, discriminates against 
another person, B, if, and only if, A intentionally treats B worse 
than A treats, or would treat, others in similar circumstances 
as B, and that therefore much of what passes for genetic 
discrimination is not discrimination at all.  Nonetheless, 
decisionmaking based on genetic information is not without its 
problems.  As I see it, the main moral problem is simply that 
such decisionmaking may give rise to harmful consequences for 
those affected.  For example, they may not be able to get health 
or life insurance, or they may not be able to get a job (at least 
not the job they want).  We have ample reason to provide legal 
protection for the “genetically disadvantaged” just as we have 
                                                          
 53. Fiss, supra note 38, at 764. 
 54. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 150-55 (1974) 
(discussing the relation between process and result). 
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reason to provide legal protection for those who are unable to 
compete on the job market, fall ill, or simply get old.  The exact 
nature of the consequences will of course depend on the system 
of social security in force at the time, among other things.  
Since this is so, problems of “genetic disadvantage” may be less 
urgent in Sweden, say, than in the United States. 
